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The Principle of Opportunity in the Czech 
Criminal Procedure Code
Zasada oportunizmu 
w czeskim Kodeksie postępowania karnego
SUMMARY
This article deals with two principles – the principle of legality and the principle of opportunity 
which can be seen as contradictory at first sight because only the first mentioned is considered to be 
a traditional pillar of criminal procedures in continental European countries. The main aim of this 
article is to emphasize the role of the principle of opportunity in the Czech criminal procedure and 
to summarize basic institutes which express this principle.
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INTRODUCTION
This article deals with two principles – the principle of legality and the prin-
ciple of opportunity which can be seen as contradictory at first sight because only 
the first mentioned is considered to be a traditional pillar of criminal procedures 
in continental European countries. The main aim of this article is to emphasize the 
role of the principle of opportunity in the Czech criminal procedure and to sum-
marize basic institutes which express this principle. 





I. ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES 
IN THE CZECH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The authors would like to emphasize that not all the essential principles of the 
Czech criminal procedure are going to be mentioned in this article but only those 
which are connected to the topic of this article. But as all the principles of the 
criminal procedure form an interconnected system, a majority of them is going to 
be mentioned here.
The system of essential principles of criminal procedure is based on its con-
stitutional basis which is created especially by the Constitution and by the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The system of essential principles has to 
be understood as a coherent unit where individual principles are linked together 
and built on each other. The investigative, prosecuting and adjudicating bodies 
apply these principles proportionally, especially in complicated cases. This means 
that it is not possible to interpret them as contradictory but on the contrary – they 
have to be interpreted as complementary. Therefore, it is possible to call them 
principles rather than rules. The essential principles have to be interpreted in the 
essence of the Constitution and the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. 
A very specific role plays the provision of the Art. § 4 of the Charter which states 
that while employing the provisions concerning limitations upon the fundamental 
rights and freedoms, the essence and significance of these rights and freedoms 
must be preserved. Such limitations shall not be misused for purposes other than 
those for which they were enacted. The Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) undoubt-
edly is a norm providing the mentioned limits. 
The supreme principle of the criminal procedure is the principle of due 
legal process which is regulated in the Art. 2 of the CPC. It is a statutory expres-
sion of the provision stipulated in the Art. 8 § 2 of the Charter. The essential role of 
this principle is expressed also by the fact that it is regulated as the first one in the 
CPC. In the context of the main topic of this article it is necessary to emphasize 
that in the continental criminal procedures the principle of due process is superior 
to the principle of the true finding of the facts of the case (material truth). It is not 
possible to reveal the truth by breaking the law (see the English law of evidence 
in this context where this principle is not fully established)1. Such evidence is in-
admissible in court. Revealing the truth is not an absolute value in the democratic 
states because the criminal procedure is based on the rule of law2. 
1 N. Cooper, The Fruit of the Poisoned Tree – the Admissibility of Evidence in Civil Cases, 
“British German Jurists’ Association”, p. 2, www.bgja.org.uk/Documents/2011/NigelCooper.pdf 
[access: 10.11.2015]. On the contrary, the American concept is based on the “fruit of the poisoned 
tree” which is similar to the European concept of rule of law in evidence law. 
2 In this context see the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights Gäfgen vs. Germany, 
application No. 22978/05, 30 June 2008.
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Another essential principle is the presumption of  innocence. This prin-
ciple is regulated in the Art. 2 § 2 of the CPC, at the constitutional level it is stipu-
lated in the Art. 40 § 2 of the Charter and at the international level it is stated in the 
Art. 6 § 2 of the European Convention. This principle is inextricably linked to the 
principle of material truth because the court verdict on guilt and punishment can 
be served when all the doubt concerning the guilt of the defendant has been elimi-
nated. In this context the institute of agreement on guilt and punishment gained 
importance because the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) stated that not 
only a judicial decision on guilt and punishment but also a guilty plea shall be con-
sidered as a legal finding of truth. Nevertheless, a guilty plea automatically does 
not have to mean the breaking of the presumption of innocence because this prin-
ciple is in the disposition of the defendant who can waive this right by pleading 
guilty3. Presumption of innocence is nowadays not only a due process guarantee 
but also a remedy to protect one’s personality and reputation4.
The Czech Republic belongs to the system of continental criminal procedure 
where the pr inciple  of  legal i ty  is the leading concept how to prosecute crimi-
nal offences. This principle which says that the public prosecutor is obliged to 
prosecute all the criminal offences which he gets to know about is statutory regu-
lated in the Art. 2 § 3 of the CPC. This principle is linked to the duty of the state 
bodies to proceed ex officio which expresses the state monopoly on prosecution. 
The self-help was fully eliminated and the state gained the authority to prosecute 
all criminal offences during the historical development in the Czech Republic. By 
this development the private action was taken away but the bill of a recodification 
of the CPC regulates this institute although foreign experience shows that insti-
tutes like private and subsidiary action are not used in practice5. This idea to regu-
late again the private action expresses the overall re-privatizing tendencies of the 
criminal procedures, which is closely linked to the penetration of the opportunity 
principle to the continental criminal procedures. According to a research carried 
out by Jehle and Wade6, there is no country in Europe which applies in the pre-trial 
procedure only a legality principle. There occur some elements of an opportunity 
principle. Nevertheless, the essential principle of starting the criminal proceedings 
should be the legality principle in continental Europe. The discretion of a public 
prosecutor should be limited to minor crimes.
3 Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights Lutz vs. Germany, application No. 9912/82, 
25 August 1987.
4 See the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights Khuzhin and others vs. Russia, ap-
plication No. 13470/02, 23 October 2008.
5 See e.g. the commentary to the Austrian regulation in the Austrian CPC: S. Seiler, Strafproz-
essrecht, 12. überarb. Auflage, Wien 2012, p. 89. 
6 J.M. Jehle, M. Wade, Coping with Overloaded Criminal Justice System, Berlin 2006, p. 27 
and following. 
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The principle of legality is bound to the duty of  the s ta te  bodies  to 
search for  the evidence and to  the pr inciple  of  the mater ia l  t ruth 
because the state bodies have to proceed ex officio while investigating the crime 
and gathering the evidence. As for the continental criminal procedures, the state 
bodies have to search for both the liberating and incriminating evidence, which is 
in contrast to the typical common law division of the criminal case (case for the 
defence, case for the prosecution), which is called a two-case approach. However, 
the prosecution has a duty to communicate the evidence in favour of the defence 
to the party of the defence if the prosecution gains such evidence. Rules regulating 
the communication between the parties are called disclosure rules7.
Another important principle which is connected to the efficiency of crimi-
nal procedure and to the penetration of the opportunity principle to the European 
criminal procedures is the r ight  of  the defendant  to  an adequate  length 
of  cr iminal  procedure. The European criminal systems are overloaded and 
look for ways how to enhance the efficiency of criminal proceedings which is 
rated by the length of criminal procedure while respecting the rights of the parties 
at the same time (defendant and the injured party/victims of crime). This require-
ment is stipulated in Art. 6 § 1 of the European Convention, and the ECHR has so 
far served a big load of judgments on this topic (concerning the Czech Republic as 
well). According to the Council of Europe Recommendation on simplification of 
criminal procedure of 1987, there are several ways how to enhance efficiency of 
criminal proceedings without undermining traditional principles of the continental 
criminal procedure. The Recommendation aims especially at regulating simplified 
procedures at minor crimes and regulating some elements of the principle of op-
portunity (the Recommendation calls it principles of discretionary prosecution). 
Nowadays there is hardly any jurisdiction in the continental Europe which does 
not enable the public prosecutor to prosecute minor offenses at his own discretion. 
There is mostly one specific procedural institute which mirrors the principle of 
opportunity and it is the discretion of a public prosecutor not to prosecute a minor 
offense when there is a lack of a public interest. This institute is very common in 
criminal procedure codes in European countries (e.g. the Czech Republic, Austria, 
Germany, Slovakia, etc.). 
 
7 See C. Schuon, International Criminal Procedure. A Clash of Legal Cultures, Hague 2010, 
p. 15 and following. In England and Wales the public prosecution has a duty to inform the defendant 
about evidence in favor of the defence since the forties of the 20th century. As the so-called disclo-
sure rules were very extensive and formalized, in 2012, a new version was enacted which is simpler, 
synoptic and enhances the efficiency of the public prosecution in communication with the defence. 
In the USA, the disclosure rules are less formalized, the exculpatory evidence has to be handed 
over on the defence in all cases. For more details see J. Gross, Review of Disclosure in Criminal 
Proceedings, 2011, www.judiciary.gov.uk/JCO%2FDocuments%2FReports%2Fdisclosure-review-
september-2011.pdf [access: 10.11.2015]. 
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II. PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AND PRINCIPLE OF OPPORTUNITY 
– A COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP
The principle of opportunity can be characterised as a possibility given to the 
public prosecutor not to prosecute all the criminal offences which he gets to know 
about. The public prosecutor can use this possibility in cases where the prosecu-
tion would not be useful, effective or even unjust, which would cause that the pur-
pose of the criminal procedure would not be achieved8. This concept is often seen 
as contradictory to the principle of legality which bounds the public prosecutor to 
prosecute all the offences. The requirement of efficiency of criminal procedure, 
however, demands regulation of special institutes which would enable the public 
prosecutor to proceed more flexibly while assessing concrete minor crimes. The 
criterion whether the public prosecutor should weigh up the use of the principle of 
opportunity is the criterion of the public interest. The Czech CPC differs among 
the cases where no public interest is recognizable and where the public interest is 
weakened and due to this fact the case shall be resolved by using some pre-trial 
(simplified) procedures, especially diversions.
III. EFFICIENCY OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
– A GENERAL PROBLEM
There are many perspectives, from which the concept of efficiency can be 
defined; however, a significant view of this category is from the perspective of the 
length of criminal procedure. The longer the criminal procedure is, the more is the 
justice weakened (see the legal maxim justice delayed, justice denied). Art. 6 of 
the European Convention regulates the right to the reasonable length of criminal 
proceedings which is a part of the right to due process; therefore, there is no due 
process without the adequate length of criminal procedure. Beyond making the 
criminal procedure more effective is therefore the idea of shortening the length 
of criminal procedure and accelerating it and, at the same time, the need to main-
tain the rights of the defendant and those of the victims, which is definitely not 
a simple task.
Generally, the criminal justice systems have been hit during the recent de-
cades by increase of petty crime on the one hand, and by emergence of new, more 
sophisticated, forms of crime (e.g. cybercrime, organized transnational crime, 
8 See the division of the motives of regulating opportunity according to the Polish lawyer 
Cieślak: a procedural and material motive. Procedural motive occurs while prosecuting minor 
crimes, which often results in inefficiency of criminal procedure because pursuing the whole crimi-
nal process with engaging the court does not pay off. On the other hand, the material motive em-
phasizes the possible injustice of criminal proceedings at minor crimes. See M. Cieślak, Polska 
procedura karna. Podstawowe założenia teoretyczne, Warszawa 1984, p. 292.
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etc.) on the other hand. The overall reaction towards this problem can be divided 
into three groups: increase in staff of criminal justice, decriminalization, alterna-
tive dispute resolution (diversions) and regulation of summary procedure at petty 
crimes9. This article is focused on the elements of the opportunity principle which 
are expressed in the following way:
− discontinuing of criminal procedure due to lack of public interest,
− diversions as a result of a weakened public interest,
− new concept of opportunity in a form of a cooperating witness.
IV. CZECH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
Opportunity principle – discontinuing of criminal procedure 
due to the lack of public interest
The institute of discontinuing of criminal proceedings on the base of lack of 
public interest is a very common regulation in continental Europe (see e.g. Austria 
or Germany). It is connected to the idea that the offenses of a less gravity should 
not be prosecuted if there is lack of public interest, in the most cases it means that 
prosecution is not worthy. The Czech Criminal Procedure Code also knows such 
provisions. A public prosecutor can discontinue a criminal procedure if it is clear 
that the goal of the criminal procedure was already achieved (in brief – because 
the facts of the case prove that the committed crime is of a lower gravity than other 
crimes of this kind). In this context it should be noted that such regulation which 
eliminates further criminal prosecution of minor crimes when the gravity of the 
crime is low and the circumstances of the case show that the goal of the prosecu-
tion has already been achieved is called a procedural corrective. In contrast to 
the so-called material corrective, the committed act is really a crime whereas the 
material corrective applies to the situations when the public prosecutor/police is 
just assessing whether the committed act was a crime. The procedural corrective 
is a typical way of handling minor crimes in democratic states where material 
criminal law is based on the so-called formal concept of a criminal act. This is also 
the case of the Czech Republic. A very similar regulation can be found in Austria 
where the public prosecutor has to discontinue the criminal proceedings when 
circumstances foreseen by law occur10. Austrian regulation openly expresses the 
Roman maxima minima non curat praetor. The Czech CPC does not regulate such 
an open opportunity as the Austrian one.
9 A. Sotolář, F. Púry, P. Šámal, Alternativní řešení trestních věcí v praxi, Praha 2000, p. 5.
10 To analyse this topic in detail see e.g. A. Venier, Einstellung und Anklage im neuen Strafproz-
essrecht, [in:] 35. Ottensteiner Fortbildungsseminar aus Strafrecht und Kriminologie, Wien 2007.
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Opportunity principle – diversions
The diversions definitely constitute a more simple procedure of achieving jus-
tice at minor offenses but, at the same time, they are an expression of a restorative 
justice concept which prefers rehabilitation of criminals to strict punishing them 
by the sentence of imprisonment. The Czech CPC distinguishes among the fol-
lowing kinds of diversions11:
− conditional discontinuing of criminal procedure,
− agreement on guilt and punishment.
Condit ional  discont inuing of  cr iminal  procedure. This institute has 
been effective since 1994. Criminal proceedings can be conditionally discontin-
ued both in the pre-trial stage (by the public prosecutor) and in the trial stage (by 
judge) of criminal procedure and if the defendant fulfils all the conditions imposed 
on him, criminal proceedings will be definitely discontinued. The law determines 
some conditions under which the criminal proceedings can be conditionally dis-
continued: the perpetrator has to confess to the committed crime and has to pay 
damages if he inflicted any harm. This diversion is used very often; it is a common 
way of resolving petty crime. However, the requirement of confession seems to be 
quite problematic. There are many defendants who feel not guilty and confession 
causes them a moral dilemma. Inasmuch as the confession is just a formal require-
ment, there is no need to expose the defendants to such difficulties. It would be 
better to draw inspiration for example from the Austrian CPC where under such 
circumstances only consent of the defendant to resolve the case by using this di-
version is required.
Agreement  on gui l t  and punishment . This institute is a new kind of di-
version which is, however, very controversial and it is debatable if it really fulfils 
its alleged function – the acceleration of the criminal procedure. The agreement 
on guilt and punishment was enacted in 2012 after a long debate (at least since the 
year 2005) concerning the aims and the factual wording of the act. The result is 
a true hybrid which, in the authors’ opinion, does not accelerate the criminal pro-
cedure and furthermore weakens some essential principles (e.g. the principle of 
immediacy, nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare, presumption of innocence, etc.). On 
the other hand, regulating this institute was a real challenge for the Czech Parlia-
ment because such institutes are regulated in many European countries (Slovakia, 
11 Diversions in crimes of juveniles and criminal order are left aside. The settlement between 
the parties is also left aside because this institute is rather a restorative justice means of resolving 
a conflict between the parties. This institute does unconditionally not have to accelerate the criminal 
proceedings because its main function is different and as the practice shows sometimes it takes time 
before the parties make this agreement. On the other hand, if both parties are willing to settle their 
dispute like this, there definitely is a possibility to accelerate the procedure.
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Poland, Spain, Italy, etc.) and it appears that these agreements really work and do 
accelerate the criminal proceedings. However, some jurisdictions avoid regulat-
ing it due to a likely conflict with traditional continental principles of criminal 
procedure (Austria). Germany underwent a long way to regulate this institute and 
it had been a common practice which, however, did not have a statutory basis12. 
This situation changed in 2009 when the German Parliament enacted the law on 
agreement on guilt and punishment13.
The Czech regulation has just little in common with the Anglo-American 
guilty plea/plea bargaining. On the base of an agreement on guilt and punishment, 
minor and medium severe crimes can be resolved, which is a difference between 
the conditional discontinuing of criminal procedure where only minor crimes can 
be resolved by using this. The defendant is not entitled to demand to resolve his 
case by this agreement; it is fully at discretion of the public prosecutor. The de-
fendant has to confess committing the crime in question but, at the same time, the 
facts of the case must be sufficiently proved and must show that the defendant is 
highly likely to have committed it. The issue of confession is topical because the 
duty to confess is a moral dilemma for the defendant who feels innocent; further-
more, the confession cannot be considered as a confessio est regina probationum 
and because of that it does not seem logical to require such a confession. It is just 
a formal requirement which could be simply replaced by the Austrian form of 
consent with resolving the criminal case by diversions – complicity with resolv-
ing the case by diversion, the defendant agrees that his case will be resolved by 
a diversion14. If the facts of the case are not sufficiently cleared, it is not possible 
for the public prosecutor to offer the defendant making an agreement (in spite of 
the fact that the defendant confessed). This is the first big difference between the 
typical common law guilty plea. Ambos points out that this kind of approach is re-
ally typical for the continental lawyers and it is not obvious only at a national level 
but also at an international one. Ambos mentions a trial at the ad hoc Court for 
East Timor where the defendant pled guilty but the panel of judges (a panel created 
by continental lawyers) examined so thoroughly if his guilty plea had been made 
voluntarily, consciously and in an unequivocal way that, at the end, the defendant 
gave up his guilty plea and the trial continued in a standard way. In this context 
Ambos adds that usually when the continental lawyers want to regulate some 
common law institutes like guilty plea, they overregulate it, so that such institute 
12 See e.g. J. Musil, Dohody o vině a trestu (Absprachen) v Německu, “Právník“ 2008, č. 3, 
p. 217 and following.
13 See § 257c of the German Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozessordnung). 
14 See E.E. Fabrizy, Die österreichische Strafprozessordnung (Strafprozessordnung 1975) mit 
dem neuen Vorverfahren und den wichtigsten Nebengesetzen. Kurzkommentar, 11. neu bearbeitete 
Auflage, Wien 2011, p. 491.
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loses its basic function – the acceleration of the criminal proceedings15. Another 
problem is connected, for example, to the charge dismissal practice (common in 
the USA – the defendant pleads guilty to one offense and the public prosecutor 
dismisses other charges against him), according to the wording of the statute, such 
practice is illegal, but it virtually happens and it happened even before the law on 
agreement on guilt and punishment became effective. As for the role of the judge 
while approving the agreement on guilt and punishment, it is similar to the role of 
the common law judge who only acts as a guarantor of the procedural correctness 
because the Czech judge only checks if the proposal is procedurally correct and 
does not review the contents of the agreement. By this regulation the principles 
of immediacy, publicity, of oral proceedings and of free evaluation of evidence 
are weakened. As for the sentence bargaining, there is no special statutory rate for 
the defendants who made the agreement on guilt and punishment and furthermore 
they are not allowed to bargain somehow their punishment. However, if they co-
operate with the police and with the public prosecutor, they can await a sentence 
which is at the lowest statutory rate. This is, however, a general practice. An effec-
tive use of this instrument is possible at crimes (statutory rate higher than 5 years 
of imprisonment) because other diversions can be used only at minor crimes. To 
sum up, this institute seems to be quite useless but, on the other hand, it is quite 
early to draw some premature conclusions as this act has been effective only one 
year and a half. 
V. COOPERATING WITNESS
This institute is a typical instrument of a new pragmatic use of opportunity16. 
Weigend states that the increase in complicated organized crime and difficulties in 
obtaining evidence induced the situation that the state bodies resigned to fulfil the 
essential purpose of criminal procedure and chose to trade with justice by using 
the institute of a crown witness.
A cooperating witness, the Czech form of the crown witness, serves for sim-
pler revealing of organized crime where in many cases the facts of the case can-
not be revealed by other means than by using somebody from the inside of such 
an organized group. These people who are perpetrators of serious crime but who 
are, at the same time, willing to cooperate with the police are called cooperating 
witnesses. It is definitely debatable if this approach is correct but it is justifiable 
because two interests are weighed up – the interest in revealing and punishing 
members of an organized group which will not be able to commit serious crime 
15 See K. Ambos, International Criminal Procedure – Adversarial, Inquisitorial or Mixed?, 
“International Criminal Law Review” 2003, No. 3, p. 18. 
16 See T. Weigend, Das „Opportunitätstprinzip“ Zwischen Einzelfallgerechtigkeit und Sy-
stemeffizienz, „Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft” 1997, p. 108 and following. 
The Principle of Opportunity in the Czech Criminal Procedure Code





anymore and the interest in punishing one single member of this group who is, 
however, willing to help to reveal a group of which he is a member. It is a dilemma 
but usually the interest in destroying an organized group prevails. Furthermore, 
such cooperating witnesses must fulfil other conditions such as not committing a 
crime of murder or a sexual crime while being a member of the organized group 
(see the Austrian and Czech regulation).
In the context of the discussed topic the institute of collaborating witness is 
interesting because of the potential to accelerate the criminal proceedings by re-
vealing the evidence by this witness, which consequently enables the police to 
proceed faster. The Czech regulation unfortunately has not a very big potential to 
accelerate the proceedings but recently there have been some amendments which 
enhanced its possibilities. 
The cooperating witness has been regulated since 2010. This institute is not 
unfamiliar to many European countries (it is regulated in Germany, Austria, Italy, 
Poland, etc.). The original wording of the law did not have much potential to make 
the criminal procedure more efficient. Firstly, the defendant had to fulfil many 
conditions to be labelled in the indictment by the public prosecutor as a cooperat-
ing witness. Furthermore, this labelling was fully at the discretion of the public 
prosecutor and it could easily happen that the defendant fulfilled all the statutory 
conditions (confession, reporting essential facts able to reveal crimes being com-
mitted by an organized group and more) but in spite of this fact he was not labelled 
as a cooperating witness in the indictment. Secondly, the court was not obliged to 
reduce the penalty of such witness, this was also fully at the court’s discretion. As 
a result, this institute was hardly used because it was extremely disadvantageous 
for the defendant to expose himself to a dangerous situation when the prospec-
tive benefits were unsure. In this context it is good to mention that a very similar 
regulation was effective (but obsolete) in Austria17 and it is incomprehensible why 
the Czech Parliament enacted such law which was doomed to failure from the 
very beginning. 
Consequently, due to the factual uselessness there was enacted an amendment 
to the CPC concerning cooperating witness. This amendment regulated a pos-
sible impunity of the cooperating witness if he fulfils a few strict conditions. If he 
does so, the court must not impose a punishment on the cooperating witness. The 
difference is then that the court is obliged (it is not at its discretion anymore) to 
waive the punishment or to mitigate the punishment of the cooperating witness. 
However, this procedure is connected to the trial. The pre-trial procedure is still 
the same, it means that it is still fully at the discretion of the public prosecutor to 
label the defendant as a cooperating witness in the indictment or not. The practical 
17 See § 41a of the Austrian Criminal Procedure Code, Act No. 1975/631 Coll.
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use of this amendment cannot be properly evaluated now as it has been effective 
since 2012. 
The Czech Parliament could, however, draw its inspiration from the Austrian 
Criminal Procedure Code where the cases of the cooperating witnesses can be 
resolved fully during the pre-trial procedure on the base of a decision of a public 
prosecutor as a kind of diversion when the criminal proceedings against a cooper-
ating witness is conditionally discontinued18. A very similar regulation exists also 
in Slovakia where it is possible to discontinue the prosecution of a cooperating 
witness in a pre-trial procedure as well19. This institute is also regulated in Ger-
many, Italy or Poland20.
CONCLUSION
Penetration of the common law elements into the continental European crimi-
nal procedures is a trend which is closely connected to the issue of efficiency of 
criminal procedure as such. The Czech criminal procedure is not an exception 
in this process. An integral part of this process is also a debate concerning the 
nature of continental criminal procedure, especially the essential principles and 
their possible erosion. However, the principle of opportunity provides an effective 
possibility how to deal with overloaded justice. Based on this fact, the principle 
of opportunity should be considered as a complementary principle to the principle 
of legality. 
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STRESZCZENIE
Artykuł dotyczy dwóch zasad – zasady legalizmu oraz zasady oportunizmu, które na pierwszy 
rzut oka mogą być postrzegane jako sprzeczne, ponieważ jedynie pierwsza z nich jest uważana 
za tradycyjny filar postępowania karnego w państwach Europy kontynentalnej. Celem niniejszego 
opracowania jest podkreślenie roli, jaką pełni zasada oportunizmu w procedurach postępowania 
karnego w Czechach oraz przedstawienie głównych instytucji, które wyrażają tę zasadę.
Słowa kluczowe: legalizm; oportunizm; czeski Kodeks postępowania karnego
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